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Part 4 is a valuable addendum giving 
academic, primarily historical, reviews 
of military ethics in the Islamic (John 
Kelsay), Chinese (Ping-cheung Lo), 
and Indian (Torkel Brekke) traditions� 
The editors provide summary introduc-
tions to all four parts, and they asked 
the authors to begin each chapter with 
an abstract and to close with a conclu-
sion section preceding a list of refer-
ences� All three features are helpful� 
Aptly titled a “research companion,” this 
is a cutting-edge effort by many leading 
students of military ethics� I learned ma-
jor things from every author; and while I 
especially admire certain chapters, other 
experts are likely to applaud different 
contributions most, depending on their 
own backgrounds� However, all the 
chapters are aimed at advanced scholars 
or the highest level of decision makers� 
Finally, two critical remarks underscore 
scholarly responsibilities� The word 
guerrilla is spelled with a single r more 
than a score of times—even quoted 
materials repeatedly are mangled—in 
an otherwise laudable chapter by the 
volume’s expert on unconventional 
warfare� Second, an author asserts that 
the Gulf of Tonkin incident was merely a 
matter of erroneous U�S� Navy report-
ing� While the Navy now judges that the 
night “battle” of 4 August 1964 never 
took place, no one doubts that the 2 
August day engagement of USS Maddox 
(DD 731) and three North Vietnamese 
P-4 torpedo boats happened� (There 
were eyewitnesses and photographs; 
a Vietnamese 12�7 mm machine-gun 
round lodged in Maddox’s superstruc-
ture; and in 1984 General Vo Nguyen 
Giap told former Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara the attack was delib-
erate�) The lesson for all of us is that, in 
professional ethics, theories are interest-
ing but facts matter, usually decisively�
THOMAS GRASSEY
Waging War, Planning Peace: U.S. Noncombat 
Operations and Major Wars, by Aaron Rapport� 
Ithaca, N�Y�, and London: Cornell Univ� Press, 
2015� 266 pages� $79�95�
Innovative, provocative, and compelling, 
Aaron Rapport’s Waging War, Planning 
Peace offers a distinct perspective on 
U�S� failures in postwar stability and 
reconstruction operations since 1941� 
The disconnect between waging war 
and planning peace is the subject of this 
intriguing study that applies theories of 
national security policy to four his-
torical case studies� A lecturer at the 
Department of Politics and International 
Studies at the University of Cambridge, 
Rapport examines how the ambitious 
state-building aims of U�S� presidents 
and senior advisers were consistently 
undermined by meager planning� 
Rapport invokes “construal level theory” 
to explain postconflict reconstruction 
failures following World War II and 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, arguing that 
the Roosevelt and Bush administrations 
projected confidence and visionary ob-
jectives for peace after the war without 
providing the necessary organizational 
support� In turn, failures following the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars are attributed 
to administrations that did not articulate 
end-state agendas and instead concen-
trated on immediate operational and 
military gains� The flaw common to the 
actors in all four historical studies is that 
kinetic aspects of the war were priori-
tized at the expense of postwar planning� 
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The construal level theory consists of 
several key components� The more dis-
tant our goals, the greater we construe 
the long time horizon abstractly� The 
more immediate our goals, the greater 
we construe the short-term horizon in 
detail� Consequently, the desirability 
of distant goals can overshadow their 
feasibility� National leaders who for-
mulate lofty goals for the distant future 
support transformative objectives, while 
those who focus on the particulars of 
combat operations tend to be preoc-
cupied with a maintenance outlook 
that is far more cautious about future 
estimations� Proponents of desirability 
and transformative strategies for peace 
display deductive reasoning based on 
preexisting concepts, whereas advocates 
of feasibility and maintenance ap-
proaches demonstrate inductive thinking 
sensitive to context-specific informa-
tion� Undergirding these processes in 
strategic assessments, the construal 
level theory presupposes the dynamic 
of communication fluency� In other 
words, civilian and military leaders’ 
predispositions toward either desir-
ability or feasibility will determine the 
flow of information and whether the 
incoming data are accepted or rejected�
Rapport suggests that the semantics of 
“postwar” be reformulated� The seman-
tics of “post” makes reconstruction en-
deavors more of an afterthought, and the 
“post” verbiage buys into a sequential 
scheme of arranging operations instead 
of a fluid model of cooperative interac-
tion� From this descriptive analysis, he 
offers a prescriptive remedy to the prob-
lem: instead of sequencing or paralleling 
phases of the total operation, he suggests 
overlapping the coordination of waging 
war and planning peace so as to harmo-
nize stabilization considerations with 
kinetic aims� To that end, greater joint 
agency collaboration between military 
and civilian leaders—both desirability  
visionaries and feasibility organizers— 
must take place for abstract ends 
and concrete means to synergize in 
the range of military operations� By 
bringing the why of desirability and 
the how of feasibility together through 
interagency cooperation, U�S� presi-
dents and their senior advisers will be 
better equipped to win the peace, and 
not simply the war, through a con-
tinuum of joint operational planning�
Overall, Rapport’s use of construal 
level theory for understanding the gap 
between jus in bello and jus post bellum 
is persuasive� Readers must decide 
whether this particular theory assumes 
too great a role in explaining the lack 
of correlation between war fighting 
and state building and, in the process, 
minimizes the cultural, political, and 
economic factors that frame the context 
and motivate the power brokers of a 
given historical period� For scholars and 
students, policy makers, and warfight-
ers, Rapport’s interdisciplinary work 
in history, international policy, and 
psychology is a fascinating study worth 
the time and money to read and heed� 
EDWARD ERWIN
Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contrac-
tors and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Bruce E� Stanley� 
Lincoln, Neb�: Potomac Books, 2015� 238 pages� 
$25 (paperback)�
Bruce Stanley, a retired Army officer and 
professor at the United States Army’s 
School of Advanced Military Studies, has 
written a detailed and well-documented 
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